

MEMO TO: Doug Feith
Pete Pace

October 28, 2004 - H&C 10/27

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: Post-Election Strategy for Iraq

Iraq

Doug/Pete,

I agree with John Abizaid and Steve Cambone that we should get some contingency thinking going on how we would deal with the possible outcomes of an Iraqi election.

Could the two of you get back to me and the Secretary quickly with a plan of action? I would start with a very small cell that just lays out four or five possible election outcomes and then tries to enumerate the three or four major issues that we might face in each of those possible outcomes. If you prefer to start with a smaller number of outcomes and/or issues, that would be fine.

28 Oct 04

25 Oct 04



OSD 18024-04

FOUO

October 27, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Strategy

Attached is a memo from Steve Cambone. If you agree with them, as I do, would you please act on both of these recommendations? Otherwise, please see me.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/25/04 USD (I) Memo to SecDef re: 10/23 Conversation with Gen Abizaid

DHR:ss
102704-11

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

→ SD -
I agree with Steve.
I've asked
- Ken Krieg and Jim Roche
- Faith Pace
to recommend a way - a lead or each
FW



FOUO

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Tab A

MEMO TO: VCJCS

Secretary of the Air Force
Director, PA&E

October 28, 2004 -14C 10/29

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FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

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SUBJECT: Operations Analysis of UAV Employment in Iraq

Could you please come back to me quickly with some recommendations on how we might pursue Steve Cambone's suggestion here about analyzing the use of UAVs in Iraq?

I had exactly the same reaction when we were briefed by the Air Force last week on the UAV issue. The subject needs a systems approach.

Could you get back to me quickly with some suggestions about who we might task to do this and how? Thanks.

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28 Oct 04

25 Oct 04



18024-04

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE

SUBJECT: Saturday, October 23 Conversation with General Abizaid

General Abizaid called me on Saturday seeking advice on responding to Chairman Hunter's request for comments on the Intelligence Reform Bill. I advised him against responding. General Abizaid said he would follow that advice.

General Abizaid and I then spoke about strategy in Iraq. He said he could use help in two categories:

- ✓ • development of a better approach for the employment of UAVs and other sensors, and
- ✓ • development of a post-election strategy in Iraq.

With respect to UAV employment, General Abizaid expressed the view that we are making sub-optimal use of the assets. In my view, this is a classic operations research problem. Given a competing set of objectives (escorting convoys, patrolling, lines of communication, power lines and pipelines, providing surveillance for critical infrastructure, etc., in addition to supporting tactical operations), limited resources, and an adaptable adversary, how does the Commander optimize the return on the employment



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of those resources? **This is a task that can be assigned** to one or more of the **war colleges**, perhaps to a **Service** organization—e.g. Checkmate (USAF), the Joint **Staff**, PA&E or even an **FFRDC** such as RAND.

With respect to a Dost-election strategy, General Abizaid did not elaborate in any detail. He did, however, **ask a** telling question: having worked hard to ensure that **an** election in Iraq will be **a** success, what **tasks** will **need to be** accomplished **after** the election by **the** Coalition, and what strategy **should be** employed?

A post-election strategy will need to be **embraced by the entire USG**; however, it is my assumption **that** DoD will **need** to prompt discussion of the subject. Before approaching **our USG** colleagues, we might sketch a set of **two** or three scenarios that might emerge from the election. For example, the election might result in a **more** sectarian than secular government in which the Shia center holds sway. **Or, a more** secular than sectarian government might emerge in which **the Kurds** hold the **balance**, etc. We might then postulate what the **agenda** of these **various** governing factions **and** coalitions might be, **identify** what we **can** and cannot **support**, and how **we** might posture the Coalition in the **country** accordingly.

If the exercise is well constructed in the beginning, it should permit **us** to adjust **our** thinking on what we will need to do **as** events on the ground clarify themselves over coming months. The purpose is not to be predictive, but instead **to give us** the opportunity to **think through various** plausible



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combinations and allow us to prepare **to** respond appropriately to the results **of** the election.

Consistent with **my** conversation **with** General Abizaid, **this** exercise should **be** done here in Washington **and** offered to General Abizaid **and** General **Casey** for comment **and** editing.

This is **an** exercise that could be led by Doug Feith and **Pete Pace**. After **the** **first** iteration, **they** could branch out bilaterally to CIA **and** the State Department. A **second** iteration could be brought before **a** Deputies' Committee just prior to **Christmas**. The object **ought** not be **an** elaborate plan, but a **set** of alternate courses **of** action based on anticipated election outcomes **and** **US** and **Coalition** objectives in **Iraq**.

CC: CJCS



TAB B

2 November 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Operations Analysis of UAV Employment in Iraq (Your Memo, 28 Oct 04)

In response to your memo, here are some recommendations that **can** be pursued to analyze the **use of UAVs in Iraq**.

Draft Terms of Reference for an Operations Research Study of the Use of UAVs and RPAs in Iraq

There currently are about **400** unmanned air vehicles of various **types** available in-country in Iraq or nearby on any given day. These range **from** the long enduring Global Hawk ISR platform, to either the ISR or **Killer-Scout** **armed** Predator remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), to the ISR I-Gnat, to the **Army's** ISR and armed Hunter RPAs, to the **Marines'** Pioneer UAVs. In addition to these systems, there **are** numerous small, **battery-powered** drones, each of **which** is not much bigger than a bird (**Desert Hawk**, **Raven**, **BatCam**, etc.). These smaller drones tend to **be** flown below **1000 feet** and may not be a serious hazard **to** other aircraft. **The** other **systems** are large and could be a danger **to** airmen **whether** they are flying aircraft or helicopters. Further, the Navy is experimenting with **a** helo-like small UAV, and the Coast Guard is experimenting with **a** small tilt-rotor drone. Even now, the skies over some of the cities **in** Iraq increasingly contain UAVs and remotely piloted aircraft, some with considerable weaponry on board.

The exploitation of the information obtained by the sensors on board the ISR **drones can** be done on the ground by tactical units (**equipped** with "Rover" lap tops which permit the direct transmission of video from vehicles like the Predator **as** well as from **manned** aircraft equipped **with** Litening II sensor pods). Also, **AC-130** gunships are equipped to receive Predator video and **work** with the Predator crews in the prosecution of **a** target. And, in the case of Predator and Global Hawk, the **control** of the aircraft **and** the exploitation of information can be done by "reach back" to the **United** States.

While these systems **started** out as experiments, enough experience has accumulated so that commanders such **as** CENTCOM need **to** have the operations of these systems conducted in a **coherent** manner. **This** already has **been** discussed by General Abizaid and the Air Force Chief of Staff. Further, while "demand" for UAVs and **RPAs** is growing, there are **not** enough, nor will there ever be enough of these systems **to** serve every individual ground unit which desires "an eye **in** the sky." The intent of this study is **to** develop appropriate concepts of operations for the major systems, and to think through the number and **types** of drones which would optimize ground operations in Iraq. To do this, the study should address, *inter alia*, the following:



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1. Categorize the **types** of **UAVs and RPAs** now flying **in** the **AOR**, both **ISR and armed, as well as** those expected **to** see action **in** the near future.

2. What is the specific mission of each of the growing variety of **UAVs and RPAs**?

3. What should be the concept of operations for each? Who should be permitted to task each? Who should control the acquisition and operation of each system?


4. How should deconfliction and orchestration of these assets be done? Who will retain control of airspace at various altitudes (e.g., it may be the case that the land forces should control all small drones which fly operationally below 1000 feet, while the Forward Air Component Commander should retain control of the employment of all others as he does for all aircraft in the theater)?

5. How should information from each category be exploited and distributed? What is the required information/data needed by various consumers of the outputs of these systems? In what timeline must information be provided? To whom? Which service should take the lead on which categories of systems?

6. For those systems which are armed, how should they be controlled? Who does and who should have the authority to designate targets and give the order to shoot? Who will take the responsibility for attacks made with such systems?

7. What is the preferred distribution of various systems in support of land forces like Army units, Marine units, and Coalition units? For Special Operations units? How many orbits of each category per day for which missions? How best can assets be deployed so as to enhance serving multiple "customers?"

We would envision this study being conducted in parallel by both the Joint Staff, in conjunction with the CENTCOM staff, and by a think rank like RAND (which may be the most qualified to develop concept of operations as well as optimization techniques).


James G. Roche
Secretary of the Air Force

cc: Mr Ken Krieg (PA&E)

